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THE VOLUNTARY ACT REQUIREMENT IN PRISON 
CONTRABAND CASES 
INTRODUCTION 
When has one committed the crime of introducing prison contraband? This 
is an important question when one is visiting a prison, voluntarily or otherwise, 
and a question which can be surprisingly difficult to answer. Most state statutes 
punishing the introduction of prison contraband look much like California’s 
statute: 
Except when otherwise authorized by law . . . any person, who knowingly brings 
or sends into, or knowingly assists in bringing into, or sending into, any state 
prison . . . or within the grounds belonging to the institution, any controlled 
substance, . . . any device, contrivance, instrument, or paraphernalia intended to 
be used for unlawfully injecting or consuming a controlled substance, is guilty 
of a felony . . . .1 
These statutes are straightforward, containing a mens rea, usually “knowingly,”2 
an actus reus, usually introducing, possessing, conveying, etc.,3 and then a list 
of prohibited objects. Moreover, the prototypical prison-contraband cases, such 
as baking a gun into a cake and mailing it to prison,4 or mailing a friend drugs 
in a package designated as legal mail,5 are equally straightforward violations of 
introducing-contraband statutes. However, in a subset of prison-contraband 
cases, where the defendant is arrested with the contraband already on his or her 
person, loaded into the back of a police car, and taken to the county jail, the 
violation is not so clear. These cases are complicated by the defendants’ simple 
defense that they did not want to bring their contraband to jail; rather, their arrest 
“forced” them to bring it into the facility. 
Usually, these cases play out like the case of People v. Gastello, where the 
defendant was arrested for being under the influence of a controlled substance 
 
 1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4573(a) (2011). 
 2. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2505(A)(1) (2016); PENAL § 4573(a); COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 18-8-203(1)(a) (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.36(A) (2013). 
 3. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2505(A)(2) (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-203(1)(a) 
(2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 221.111 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.36(A) (2013). 
 4. Jesse Rhodes, The File Inside the Cake: True Tales of Prison Escapes, SMITHSONIAN.COM 
(June 14, 2011), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/the-file-inside-the-cake-true-tales-
of-prison-escapes-15653967/ [https://perma.cc/WTR3-BLH2]. 
 5. Wilson v. Haney, 430 S.W.3d 254, 256 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014). 
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and placed in the back of a police car.6 The arresting officer informed the 
defendant that possessing controlled substances at the jail was a felony.7 The 
defendant manifested understanding but did not declare possession of any 
forbidden items.8 Once at the jail, officers conducted an intake search and 
discovered .32 grams of methamphetamine in the defendant’s sweatshirt.9 
Gastello was charged and found guilty of bringing a controlled substance into 
prison.10  
Gastello was decided in California, one of the majority of States that punish 
suspects arrested while in possession of contraband and taken to prison with 
specific, prison-contraband statutes.11 But in a handful of States, when faced 
with nearly identical facts, the courts will find the defendant innocent.12 This 
discrepancy stems from courts’ varying interpretations of their voluntary act 
requirements.13 While some courts find that defendants like Gastello commit a 
voluntary act somewhere within their possession, arrest, and journey to jail, 
others do not. Bizarrely enough though, the voluntary act requirements in these 
jurisdictions are also remarkably similar. So here is the problem, various courts 
facing effectively identical facts and with practically identical voluntary act 
requirements reach conflicting results in introducing-prison-contraband cases.14  
Part I of this paper seeks to illustrate the problem by analyzing two 
conflicting introducing-prison-contraband cases in the context of each State’s 
voluntary act requirement. Part II asks the practical question of “how?”: how 
can two courts with identical facts and identical laws come to two opposing 
 
 6. 232 P.3d 650, 652 (Cal. 2010). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 653. 
 11. Including California, ten States have found a defendant in this situation guilty of 
introducing prison contraband. North Carolina: State v. Barnes, 747 S.E.2d 912, 922 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2013); Arizona: State v. Taylor, Nos. 1 CA-CR09-0626, 1 CA-CR09-0666, 2010 WL 3597222, at 
¶ 20 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2010); Kentucky: Taylor v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 563, 566 
(Ky. 2010); Virginia: Herron v. Commonwealth, 688 S.E.2d 901, 907–08 (Va. Ct. App. 2010); 
Missouri: State v. Winsor, 110 S.W.3d 882, 888 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Ohio: State v. Cargile, 916 
N.E.2d 775, 778 (Ohio 2009); Tennessee: State v. Carr, No. M2007–01759–CCA–R3–CD, 2008 
WL 4368240, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2009); Texas: Brown v. State, 89 S.W.3d 630, 633 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002); and Iowa: State v. Canas, 597 N.W.2d 488, 497 (Iowa 1999). 
 12. Those states in the minority include: Washington: State v. Eaton, 177 P.3d 157, 162 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2008); New Mexico: State v. Cole, 164 P.3d 1024, 1027 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007); 
and Oregon: State v. Tippetts, 43 P.3d 455, 459–60 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). 
 13. All states, whether by statute or by common law, require that criminal conduct include a 
voluntary act. The comments to the Model Penal Code list 27 states that have statutory voluntary 
act requirements and 11 States with common law requirements. Presumably the remaining 12 States 
fall into one of the two categories or some mixture thereof. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 n.14 (AM. 
LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 14. See cases cited supra notes 11 and 12. 
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results? I argue that the courts employ two tools, time-framing and 
disjoining/unifying acts to reach “subjective” rather than “objective” concepts 
of voluntariness. Part III asks the “why?” question: why do courts manipulate a 
given arrestee’s conduct to reach their understanding of voluntariness? I argue 
that in addition to the language of the statutes, “includes a voluntary act,” courts 
are guided by personal means. Acknowledging that courts, at least in part, are 
deciding introducing-prison-contraband cases on personal grounds, Part IV 
offers model statutes to standardize our approach to culpability. And finally, Part 
V concludes with some parting thoughts on the voluntary act requirement as a 
whole. 
I.  THE TWO APPROACHES TO INTRODUCING-PRISON-CONTRABAND CASES 
It will help to establish a quick understanding of the voluntary act 
requirement before directly comparing two introducing-prison-contraband 
cases. A fundamental tenet of criminal law is that “[a] person is not guilty of an 
offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act 
or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable.”15 The 
Model Penal Code (“MPC”) adopts a strict construal of the language “includes 
a voluntary act.” An explanatory note following section 2.01 of the MPC states 
that, “[i]t is, however, required only that the actor’s conduct include a voluntary 
act, and thus unconsciousness preceded by voluntary action may lead to liability 
based upon the earlier conduct.” This reading of the MPC’s voluntary act 
requirement has been called “the single voluntary act” view.16 Many States have 
adopted this “single voluntary act” requirement, leading to results like the 
conviction in State v. White, where the defendant was “playing soldier” with a 
shotgun when it accidentally discharged, shooting a fourteen-year-old girl.17 The 
court held that although shooting the gun was not voluntary, “playing soldier” 
was voluntary. Therefore, because the “State need not prove the voluntariness 
of each and every act,” only that the conduct “includes a voluntary act,” the 
requirement was satisfied.18  
However, despite nearly unanimous use of the language “includes a 
voluntary act,” the single voluntary act view has not achieved unanimous 
application. A poignant portrayal of this fact comes in our introducing-prison-
contraband cases. So, armed with an understanding of the voluntary act 
requirement and the single voluntary act view, we turn to a comparison of two 
introducing-prison-contraband cases.  
 
 15. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (emphasis 
added). 
 16. Ian P. Farrell & Justin F. Marceau, Taking Voluntariness Seriously, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1545, 
1565–66 (2013). 
 17. 138 S.W.3d 783, 784 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). 
 18. Id. at 785–86. 
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The first case is State v. Winsor.19 On December 3, 2001, Ian Winsor was 
pulled over for driving the wrong direction down a one-way street.20 The acting 
officer, Sergeant K.J. Heather, collected Winsor’s information and ran it through 
a computerized database of law enforcement information.21 The search revealed 
two outstanding warrants for possession of a controlled substance and a 
probation violation.22 Accordingly, Officer Heather arrested Winsor and placed 
him in the back of the police car.23 Officer Heather informed Winsor that he was 
being taken to the county jail and that, if he had any other drugs on him, he 
should turn them over now because possessing drugs at the jail would constitute 
a felony.24 Winsor remained silent.25 As part of the admission process of the 
county jail, Winsor was searched and found to have a baggie of marijuana in his 
shorts.26 Instead of charging Winsor with possession of marijuana, the State 
charged Winsor with possession of a controlled substance on the premises of a 
county jail under section 221.111 of the Missouri Revised Statutes.27 After a 
trial, Winsor was found guilty.28 Winsor appealed on the grounds that his action 
was involuntary but the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District affirmed.29  
The second case is State v. Tippetts.30 Farrell Tippetts was arrested in his 
home and brought to the Washington County Jail.31 Before he was admitted, 
Officer Morey asked Tippetts if he had any drugs or weapons that he would be 
bringing into the jail.32 Tippetts did not declare any such items.33 Officer Morey 
then searched Tippetts and discovered a baggie of marijuana.34 Tippetts was 
charged under Oregon’s statute against supplying contraband to correctional 
facilities.35 Tippetts was found guilty after a trial.36 Tippetts also appealed, but 
unlike Winsor, Tippetts was found to be innocent because he had not voluntarily 
supplied contraband.37 
 
 19. 110 S.W.3d 882 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
 20. Id. at 884. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Winsor, 110 S.W.3d at 884. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Winsor, 110 S.W.3d at 885, 888. 
 30. 43 P.3d 455 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). 
 31. Id. at 456. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Tippetts, 43 P.3d at 456. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 459–60. 
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Both Winsor and Tippetts begin their analyses by laying out the State’s 
voluntary act statute. In Winsor, the voluntary act statute is section 562.011 of 
the Missouri Revised Statues: 
1. A person is not guilty of an offense unless his or her liability is based on 
conduct which includes a voluntary act. 
2. A “voluntary act” is: 
(1) A bodily movement performed while conscious as a result of effort or 
determination; or 
(2) An omission to perform an act of which the actor is physically capable. 
3. Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly procures or receives 
the thing possessed, or having acquired control of it was aware of his or her 
control for a sufficient time to have enabled him or her to dispose of it or 
terminate his or her control.38  
In Tippetts, the voluntary act statute is section 161.095(1) of the Oregon 
Revised Statues, which states: “The minimal requirement for criminal liability 
is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the 
omission to perform an act which the person is capable of performing.”39 Oregon 
explicitly defines some of these terms in section 161.085 of the Oregon Revised 
Statues: 
(1) “Act” means a bodily movement. 
(2) “Voluntary act” means a bodily movement performed consciously and 
includes the conscious possession or control of property. 
(3) “Omission” means a failure to perform an act the performance of which is 
required by law. 
(4) “Conduct” means an act or omission and its accompanying mental state. 
(5) “To act” means either to perform an act or to omit to perform an act. 
In comparing the statutes, we can see that both Missouri and Oregon require 
that criminal conduct “includes” a voluntary act, that an “act” is a bodily 
movement performed consciously, and that possession is a voluntary act.40 
 
 38. Winsor, 110 S.W.3d at 885–86. Interestingly, there is another possession statute, MO. REV. 
STAT. § 195.010(34) (2017), which defines possession specifically for controlled substances. The 
Winsor court never mentions this statute. It is unclear why the court in Winsor did not also make 
use of this statute since the prison contraband statute, MO. REV. STAT. § 221.111 (2017), expressly 
prohibits possessing “any controlled substance.” It is possible the court avoided this statute because 
it is used for possession charges under MO. REV. STAT. § 579.015 (2017), and the court wished to 
distinguish MO. REV. STAT. § 221.111 (2017). Or, it is possible the court simply believed using 
both possession statutes would be redundant. 
 39. Tippetts, 43 P.3d at 456. 
 40. There is one slight discrepancy between the statutes in the definition of possession. 
Missouri’s statute defines possession as “knowingly procur[ing]” the item or being “aware of his 
or her control for a sufficient time” to have disposed of it. Oregon on the other hand defines 
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The courts then apply the voluntary act statute to their prison contraband 
statutes. In Missouri, the relevant statute is section 221.111.1 of the Missouri 
Revised Statues, which states, in pertinent part:  
1. A person commits the offense of possession of unlawful items in a prison or 
jail if such person knowingly delivers, attempts to deliver, possesses, deposits, 
or conceals in or about the premises of any correctional center as the term 
“correctional center” is defined under section 217.010, or any city, county, or 
private jail: 
 (1) Any controlled substance as that term is defined by law, except upon the 
written prescription of a licensed physician, dentist, or veterinarian; 
Oregon’s relevant statute is section 162.185(1)(a) of the Oregon Revised 
Statutes, which states, in pertinent part: 
(1) A person commits the crime of supplying contraband if: 
(a) The person knowingly introduces any contraband into a correctional facility, 
youth correction facility or state hospital; 
In comparison, we can see that Missouri’s prison contraband statute 
punishes knowingly delivering, attempting to deliver, possessing, depositing, or 
concealing contraband in or about a correctional facility, and Oregon’s statute 
punishes knowingly introducing contraband into a correctional facility. While 
an argument could be made that the preposition “into” contained in Oregon’s 
statute is distinguishable from Missouri’s use of “in or about,” the common 
sense reading of these two statutes would indicate that both punish identical 
actions. 
Despite the similarities in statutes, the two courts differ drastically in the 
next step of their analysis. In Winsor, defendant’s main argument is that he was 
not “voluntarily” in or about the premises of a correctional facility and 
accordingly did not meet an essential element of the crime.41 The court rejects 
the idea that voluntary presence at the correctional facility was required.42 
Instead, the court focuses on the voluntary possession preceding Winsor’s 
presence at the county jail:  
 
possession as “conscious possession or control of property.” The difference is likely only one of 
language and not substance as conscious possession roughly encompasses both knowingly 
procuring and awareness for a sufficient period of time to enable disposal. 
 41. Winsor’s brief and subsequently the court’s decision is broken into three arguments: (1) 
“[T]hat the voluntary presence on the county jail premises of the person charged is a crucial element 
of the crime for which he stands convicted,” (2) “that his voluntary presence on the county jail’s 
premises was required,” and (3) “that his possession of a controlled substance on county jail 
premises was not a voluntary act because he was transported to the county jail against his will.” 
Winsor, 110 S.W.3d at 886–87. In reality, these three arguments are one argument: because Winsor 
was not voluntarily present at the county jail, he did not satisfy the voluntary act requirement. 
 42. Id. at 886. 
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Appellant was convicted for his voluntary conduct of possessing a controlled 
substance in or about the county jail. Appellant’s willful possession of a 
controlled substance itself constitutes the requisite voluntary act. His secreting 
the substance in or about the county jail, regardless of whether he was present 
voluntarily, satisfies evidentiary requirements to support the conviction.43 
The court is very clear on its implementation of the “single voluntary act” 
view, recognizing that Winsor’s presence may have been involuntary, but 
nonetheless finding the requisite voluntary act in his prior possession. The court 
later does a quick analysis of Winsor’s possession:  
The arresting officer asked [Winsor] if he had any other controlled substances 
on his person and informed him that bringing a controlled substance onto the 
premises of the county jail constituted a felony. Once he was apprised of this 
fact, [Winsor] had sufficient time to dispose of or terminate his control over the 
controlled substance.44 
The court found that Winsor voluntarily possessed the marijuana under 
Missouri Revised Statute 562.011(3), which requires he “was aware of his . . . 
control for a sufficient time to have enabled him . . . to dispose of it,” and 
therefore, his voluntary possession was the requisite single voluntary act.45 
In its argument in Tippetts, the State offers the same rationale employed by 
the court in Winsor to support a conviction. The court wrote, “[t]he state argues 
alternatively that, even if defendant did not voluntarily introduce the marijuana 
into the jail, he voluntarily possessed it before his arrest and that act is sufficient 
to satisfy O.R.S. 161.095(1).”46 Yet, where this rationale was sufficient in 
Winsor, the court rejects it in Tippetts, choosing instead to focus on the act of 
“introducing” the contraband and ignoring the prior act of possession.47 The 
court stated: “Defendant, however, did not initiate the introduction of the 
contraband into the jail or cause it to be introduced in the jail. Rather, the 
contraband was introduced into the jail only because the police took defendant 
(and the contraband) there against his will.”48 This fact is no less true in Winsor 
than it is in Tippetts. In both instances, the police took the defendant to the 
county jail against his will. And in both instances the defendant has delivered, 
possessed, or introduced contraband into the correctional facility, in as much as 
he brought his marijuana from outside the doors to inside the doors.  
 
 43. Id. (emphasis added). 
 44. Id. at 888. 
 45. Id. at 887. 
 46. State v. Tippets, 43 P.3d 455, 457 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). 
 47. Id. at 459. 
 48. Id. at 457. 
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II.  HOW THE TWO COURTS REACH OPPOSING CONCLUSIONS 
How then, was Ian Winsor convicted and Farrell Tippetts released? The 
answer lies in two judicial tools Mark Kelman calls “time-framing” and 
“unifying/disjoining” acts.49 Time-framing refers to establishing “the temporal 
boundaries of the criminal conduct: when that conduct can be said to begin and 
end.”50 Disjoining acts is the method of determining which acts, within a 
continuum of acts, can be said to “contribute” to or result in the criminalized 
conduct. Kelman states that unifying/disjoining occurs when: 
[W]e feel we must look beyond a single moment in time and account, in some 
fashion, for some clearly relevant earlier moment. The earlier “moment” may be 
the time at which a defendant made some judgment about the situation she was 
in, some judgment that at least contributed to the ultimate decision to act 
criminally.51 
Armed with these two tools, courts can manipulate a variety of acts to either find 
or not find a requisite voluntary act.  
Like many theories, these two tools are easier to understand in application. 
For clarity’s sake, I’ll apply time-framing and disjoining/unifying acts to a well-
cited voluntariness case, Martin v. State,52 before applying it to the introducing-
prison-contraband cases. In Martin, officers arrested the defendant, who was 
drunk in his home, and brought him outside, onto the highway, where he was in 
violation of public intoxication.53 In setting the time-frame for Martin, one could 
say the criminalized conduct begins when the defendant started drinking and 
ends when he is present on the public highway. This time-frame includes a 
certain spectrum of acts. Within this spectrum, the court can engage in 
disjoining/unifying the acts to select which acts contribute to public intoxication. 
If the court finds that the acts of drinking and being present in public are 
disjoined acts, that is, two distinct moments each contributing to the charged 
crime, the court can find that the voluntary act of drinking satisfies the voluntary 
act requirement. Alternatively, the court could limit the time-frame, claiming the 
conduct begins when the defendant is arrested and ends when he is drunk in 
public, which would exclude the voluntary act of drinking. Or, the court could 
keep a time-frame which includes the voluntary act of drinking, but not disjoin 
the acts of drinking and being present in public, in which case the unified act of 
public intoxication would be involuntary. Regardless of which route the court 
 
 49. Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. 
REV. 591, 593–95 (1981). 
 50. Larry Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship Among Voluntary Acts, Strict Liability, 
and Negligence in Criminal Law, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 84, 91 (1990). 
 51. Kelman, supra note 49, at 595. 
 52. 17 So. 2d 427 (Ala. Ct. App. 1944). 
 53. Id. at 427. 
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takes, these tools will help the court justify the inclusion or exclusion of a 
voluntary act.54 
Applying time-framing and disjoining/unifying actions to the introducing-
prison-contraband context, we begin to see the process by which these two 
courts reach opposing conclusions. In Winsor, the court explicitly disjoins the 
actions of possession and presence, when it states, “[t]o accept [Winsor]’s 
position that his voluntary act of possessing a controlled substance is somehow 
negated by the fact that he was involuntarily on the county jail’s premises would 
render section 221.111.1(1) meaningless.”55 By disjoining the actions, the court 
allows itself to create a time-frame that could either include or exclude Winsor’s 
voluntary act, possession. The court chooses to set boundaries that include the 
voluntary act, and convict Winsor on the grounds that his prior possession 
satisfies the voluntary act requirement.  
In Tippetts, the court similarly disjoins the actions but imposes a more 
limited time-frame that excludes the prior act of possession. The court neatly 
lays out the two approaches of disjoined or unified acts, by recording the parties’ 
arguments:  
The state reasons that, even if defendant did not voluntarily introduce the 
marijuana into the jail after the police arrested him, he voluntarily possessed it 
before he was arrested. The earlier voluntary act of possession, the state 
concludes, is sufficient to hold defendant criminally liable for the later 
involuntary act of introducing the marijuana into the jail. Defendant responds 
that ORS 162.185(1)(a) punishes the act of introducing the contraband into a 
correctional facility; it does not punish the act of possessing drugs.56  
The court accepts parts of both parties’ arguments. Regarding the State’s 
argument, the court acknowledges that Tippetts voluntarily possessed the drugs 
and that his possession served in some fashion as a predicate to the later 
introduction of the drugs into a correctional facility.57 However, it is the 
weakness of that predicate which persuades the court to adopt a narrow time-
frame and exclude the act of possession: “the involuntary act must, at a 
minimum, be a reasonably foreseeable or likely consequence of the voluntary 
act on which the state seeks to base criminal liability.”58 Because introducing 
marijuana into a correctional facility is not a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of possessing marijuana, the court chooses to ignore the act for the 
 
 54. To be fair, Kelman labels these “tools” unconscious interpretive constructs. It might be an 
overstatement to claim that judges are actively using time-framing and disjoining/unifying to 
cherry-pick results. Rather, as Kelman puts it, unconscious constructs “are often used to avoid 
issues inherent in [conscious constructs], issues that the legal analysts are most prone to be aware 
are controversial, perhaps insoluble, and highly politicized.” Kelman, supra note 49, at 593. 
 55. State v. Winsor, 110 S.W.3d 882, 888 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
 56. State v. Tippets, 3 P.3d 455, 459 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). 
 57. Id. at 459–60. 
 58. Id. 
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purpose of satisfying the voluntary act requirement. Thus, despite having a 
voluntary act statute requiring conduct that only “includes a voluntary act,” the 
court did not find the voluntary act of possession satisfied the statute.  
As perhaps has already been shown, the process of time-framing and 
disjoining/unifying actions can be arbitrary, and it can be abused. Regarding 
time-framing, Larry Alexander notes that, “if we time-frame too broadly we 
make the voluntary act principle vacuous.”59 And as far back as Aristotle, people 
have suggested that acts dating from childhood can in some sense be said to 
contribute to the crimes of adulthood, even involuntary crimes.60 If time-framing 
and disjoining/unifying acts are the tools allowing courts to determine whether 
a crime is voluntary, the remaining question is why do some courts seek a 
voluntary act where others do not. 
III.  WHY THE TWO COURTS REACH OPPOSING CONCLUSIONS 
That the courts in Missouri and Oregon reached different conclusions and 
how they did exhibits the arbitrary process of selecting a voluntary act, but it 
does little to reveal the guidelines the two courts followed in making their 
determination. The basic issue is why one court was willing to accept the 
voluntary act of possession but not the other court. I argue that the reason some 
States have convicted defendants in Winsor’s situation while other States have 
not rests on notions of culpability. 
The necessity of a voluntary act requirement is so apparent that it can be 
difficult to say exactly why it must exist, but most scholars agree that criminal 
conduct must include a voluntary act to ensure that punishment is appropriate 
for the actor. That is, a voluntary act is necessary to evaluate culpability.61 
 
 59. Alexander, supra note 50, at 91. 
 60. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1113b–1114a (H. Rackham trans., 1934). 
Well, but men are themselves responsible for having become careless through living 
carelessly, as they are for being unjust or profligate if they do wrong or pass their time in 
drinking and dissipation. They acquire a particular quality by constantly acting in a 
particular way. This is shown by the way in which men train themselves for some contest 
or pursuit: they practice continually. Therefore, only an utterly senseless person can fail to 
know that our characters are the result of our conduct; but if a man knowingly acts in a way 
that will result in his becoming unjust, he must be said to be voluntarily unjust. 
Aristotle uses this rationale to justify punishing the drunken criminal who, although he committed 
the crime involuntarily, was drunk by voluntary habit. 
 61. A.P. Simester, On the So-Called Requirement for Voluntary Action, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
403, 404–05 (1998) (“Criminal lawyers have often said there must at least be proof of a ‘voluntary 
act’ by the defendant if she is to be convicted of any offense. This reflects the insight that one is 
liable to be praised or blamed for the occurrence of an outcome only when one is morally 
responsible for that outcome—and that one cannot be morally responsible for bringing anything 
about unless it is brought about voluntarily.”); Luis E. Chiesa, Punishing Without Free Will, 2011 
UTAH L. REV. 1403, 1404 (2011) (“Under the standard view, the offender deserves punishment 
only if he could have abstained from committing the crime.”). Not all scholars believe that the 
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Holmes writes, “[t]he reason for requiring an act [as a precondition for the 
existence of an offense] is, that [it] implies a choice, and that it is [considered 
unfair] to make a [person] answerable for harm, unless he might have chosen 
otherwise.”62 In fact, regardless of one’s theory of punishment (utilitarian 
prevention, retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation, etc.), that punishment 
becomes unhinged from its purpose without a voluntary act.63 There is nothing 
to prevent, no conduct to be condemned and avoided, and no one to be 
rehabilitated where the punished action is involuntary. The courts have imposed 
an act requirement because of an implicit understanding that punishment loses 
its punch without a voluntary act. 
When viewed in light of its purpose, the voluntary act requirement begins to 
acquire new boundaries not present in a strict construal of its language. We 
might now ask not only, “does the conduct include a voluntary act?” but further, 
“can that voluntary act fairly predicate the derivative punishment?” When we 
ask both questions, as opposed to just the first, we get a more precise and just 
implementation of the voluntary act requirement. I believe that courts in 
introducing-prison-contraband cases have unconsciously been asking 
themselves these questions, and then using time-framing and disjoined/unified 
actions to reach their preferred result. 
 
voluntary act requirement stands as a necessary predicate to culpability. Doug Husak argues that 
“[i]f the act requirement should be construed to hold that only acts are and ought to be the objects 
of liability, it unquestionably is false” because the State regularly punishes non-acts, like 
possession. Douglas Husak, Rethinking the Act Requirement, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2437, 2439 
(2007). 
 62. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 54 (Little, Brown & Co. 1949) 
(1881). 
 63. In his book The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, Herbert Packer compiles a list of common 
theories of punishment in Chapter Three. Packer places every theory of punishment under the 
umbrella of two ultimate purposes: (1) “[T]he . . . infliction of suffering on evildoers” and (2) “the 
prevention of crime.” HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 36 (1968). 
Julian Hermida notes that these different theories all rely in some way on a voluntary act to justify 
their purpose: 
Utilitarians would see little social benefit in punishing a person who does not carry out a 
voluntary act. This argument is not based on an idea of intrinsic justice, but on the belief 
that punishing an involuntary offender would not effectively deter the offender or other 
members of society who many commit similar involuntary acts. Retributivism’s major tenet 
is that the offender deserves punishment when he ‘freely chooses to violate society’s rules.’ 
An offender who does not act voluntarily—even if he produced social harm—does not 
deserve to be punished. 
Julian Hermida, Convergence of Civil Law and Common Law in the Criminal Theory Realm, 13 U. 
MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 163, 197–98 (2005) (footnotes omitted). 
  And regarding incapacitation and rehabilitation, Packer notes, “A man who is shown to 
have committed a homicide through an accident for which he was not at fault does not present a 
case for social protection through measures of incapacitation or reform.” PACKER, supra, at 64. 
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That the courts rely not only on a strict reading of the voluntary act 
requirement, but on notions of guilt is evident in the language employed in these 
cases. The cases that find no voluntary act focus on the defendant’s lack of 
choice or autonomy. In State v. Cole, the New Mexico Court of Appeals stated 
that “a voluntary act requires something more than awareness. It requires an 
ability to choose which course to take-i.e., an ability to choose whether to 
commit the act that gives rise to criminal liability.”64 And Tippetts emphasized 
that “the involuntary act must, at a minimum, be a reasonably foreseeable or 
likely consequence of the voluntary act on which the state seeks to base criminal 
liability.”65 These cases both involve conduct that “includes a voluntary act,” 
but, because the courts were not convinced that the defendants’ actions merited 
punishment, they used time-framing and disjoining to claim no voluntary act had 
been committed. 
Those cases that do find a voluntary act also include language assessing 
whether the defendant’s voluntary conduct can fairly support punishment. Many 
of these cases focus on the decision to retain the drugs once the arresting officer 
warned the defendant that possessing drugs at the county jail will constitute a 
felony. For instance, in State v. Alvarado, the court noted:  
Finally, the circumstance here that both the arresting officer and the detention 
officer informed defendant of the consequences of bringing contraband into the 
jail and gave him an opportunity to surrender any contraband beforehand 
highlight that defendant was performing a bodily movement “consciously and 
as a result of effort and determination” when he carried the contraband into the 
jail.66 
And in Herron v. Commonwealth, the court noted: 
Further, after appellant was arrested, Thomas asked appellant if he had any drugs 
on his person, to which appellant responded that he did not. Before entering the 
jail, Thomas again asked appellant if he had any drugs on his person and advised 
appellant that there were additional charges for bringing contraband into the jail. 
However, appellant chose to conceal drugs on his person and then failed to 
disclose the drugs after being advised of the consequences of bringing drugs into 
the jail. Under these circumstances, we hold appellant’s act of taking drugs into 
the jail was voluntary.67 
The courts rely upon the officers’ warnings because the warnings impart 
knowledge of the crime onto defendants; and this knowledge is a threshold 
 
 64. 164 P.3d 1024, 1027 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting State v. Tippetts, 43 P.3d 455, 458 
(Or. Ct. App. 2002)). 
 65. Tippetts, 43 P.3d at 459–60. 
 66. 200 P.3d 1037, 1042 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). 
 67. 688 S.E.2d 901, 906 (Va. Ct. App. 2010). 
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consideration of culpability, what some authors have called an “epistemic 
precondition” of blameworthiness.68 
Interestingly though, despite their bearing on culpability, the officers’ 
warnings have little to no effect on the completion of a voluntary act. By the 
rationale set out in Winsor, the only relevant inquiry is whether the defendant 
voluntarily possessed the marijuana at the time of the arrest. Remember there 
the court stated, “Appellant’s willful possession of a controlled substance itself 
constitutes the requisite voluntary act.”69 Admittedly in Winsor, the court did 
refer to the officer’s warning in deciding that Winsor had voluntarily possessed 
the marijuana, but that was not a necessary route. The court could have 
determined that Winsor voluntarily possessed the marijuana “for a sufficient 
time to have enabled him . . . to dispose of it” because the car ride to the county 
jail was lengthy. Or, like it did in Herron, the court could find appellant had 
ample opportunity to dispose of the drugs because “[t]he evidence at trial 
showed that appellant was inside an apartment for ten to fifteen seconds before 
Officer Thomas entered.”70 These alternative methods of proving voluntary 
possession highlight the possibility that a court could meet the single voluntary 
act requirement without reference to the officers’ warnings, even though it is 
precisely those warnings which ensure culpability. 
Arguably, the officers’ warnings create a duty for the defendants to dispose 
of their drugs and the failure to do so becomes an omission, which satisfies 
liability to the same extent as a voluntary act.71 “An omission is either (a) a 
deliberate failure to perform a certain positive action or (b) a failure, whether 
deliberate or not, to fulfill a moral or legal duty or reasonable expectation.”72 
Under this definition, retaining possession of a controlled substance after a 
 
 68. Scholar Ken Levy writes that there are four conditions for the blameworthiness of an 
action: 1) knowledge, or a threshold capacity to know, that the action is morally wrong; 2) threshold 
capacity to refrain from the action; 3) control over the action; and 4) an absence of circumstances 
that excuse this performance. Ken Levy, Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible but Not 
Morally Responsible, Subject to Criminal Punishment and to Preventive Detention, 48 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1299, 1328–29 (2011). Levy refers to the knowledge that an action is morally wrong as the 
“epistemic precondition,” borrowing the term from Carla L. Harenski, Robert D. Hare & Kent A. 
Kiehl, Neuroimaging, Genetics, and Psychopathy: Implications for the Legal System, in 
RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHOPATHY: INTERFACING LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND PHILOSOPHY 125, 
139–40 (Luca Malatesti & John McMillan eds., 2010). 
 69. State v. Winsor, 110 S.W.3d 882, 886 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
 70. Herron, 688 S.E.2d at 906. 
 71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (AM. LAW INST., 1962) (“A person is not guilty of an 
offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to 
perform an act of which he is physically capable.” (emphasis added)). 
 72. Ken Levy, Killing, Letting Die, and the Case for Mildly Punishing Bad Samaritanism, 44 
GA. L. REV. 607, 632 (2010). 
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warning could conceivably fit under either category.73 However, the law 
generally requires an omission be a failure to perform while under a legal duty 
not a moral duty or reasonable expectation and certainly not the mere failure to 
perform any positive action. For example: 
[W]here a married man, during his wife’s temporary absence from home, 
engaged in a drunken debauch with an adult woman of experience, he owed her 
no legal duty of care and protection which would render him legally responsible 
for her death from an overdose of morphine, taken with suicidal intent, though 
he neglected to obtain medical assistance for her. On the other hand, where the 
mother of a young child absented herself from the family home while the child 
was locked in a bedroom and the child was killed in a fire of undetermined 
origin, she was guilty of manslaughter because of her statutory duty not to permit 
the child to become neglected.74  
Here, the duty incumbent on the defendants after they have been warned is not 
a new legal duty. The legal duty to rid themselves of the controlled substance is 
no more real or pressing after the warning than it was before the warning; with 
or without the warning, the possessor of a controlled substance stands under duty 
of possession laws to rid him or herself of that substance. Therefore, because no 
further duty has been violated, it cannot fairly be claimed that the omission 
predicating simple possession, can serve equally well as a predicate for 
introducing prison contraband. 
Yet, while there is no further legal duty, there certainly is an additional 
moral duty or reasonable expectation which accompanies these officers’ 
warnings. Once an officer has warned a defendant that possessing drugs at the 
jail will be a felony, his omission to relinquish those drugs has a heightened 
intention. Importantly, intention does not have the same legal consequences as 
voluntariness. The law frequently punishes unintentional acts, i.e., negligent 
acts, as long as the conduct includes a voluntary act.75 And the law does not 
 
 73. Levy defines a positive action as “any agent-caused event that does not essentially involve 
a failure or not-doing in its description. Running, walking, talking, and hitting are paradigmatic 
examples. They can all be described entirely in positive terms.” Id. at 633. Here, the positive action 
would be discarding. The failure to discard contraband is a positive action under category (a) and, 
under (b), a failure to fulfill a legal duty (possession laws), moral duty (controlled substances have 
a stigma attached to possession), and a reasonable expectation. 
 74. 3A GLENN C. GILLESPIE, MICHIGAN CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 91:36 (2d ed. 
1989) (first citing People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128 (Mich. 1907); then citing Wayne Cty. 
Prosecutor v. Recorder’s Court Judge, 324 N.W.2d 43 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); then citing People v. 
Ogg, 182 N.W.2d 570 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970)), Westlaw, Michigan Texts & Treatises (database 
updated April 2017). 
 75. A classic example is a car accident. Few people who get into car accidents intend them, 
and if they do they are likely to get charged with assault. Yet, we punish car accidents if there exists 
the requisite voluntary act. Some scholars, like Jerome Hall, have argued against criminalizing 
negligence because of a belief that culpability is necessarily tied to intention not voluntariness. 
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punish pure intention without an act.76 But intention does have culpability 
consequences comparable to those of voluntariness. As one scholar puts it, “it is 
never less blameworthy to bring about an evil outcome when the agent has the 
intention of bringing it about than it is to bring it about when the agent does not 
have the intention of bringing it about.”77 Therefore, while the officers’ 
warnings may not qualify the defendants’ retention of drugs as a legal omission 
satisfying the language of the voluntary act requirement, it does give an added 
level of moral reprehensibility in as much as it creates a heightened intention. 
The officers’ warnings do not help the court answer the question “does the 
conduct include a voluntary act or omission?” Rather, the officers’ warnings 
help the court determine the guilt question: “Can that voluntary act fairly 
predicate the derivative punishment?” Therefore, whether the courts choose to 
focus on the defendants’ autonomy or the officers’ warnings, in either case the 
courts are relying on both the explicit rule language of its voluntary act statute 
(“includes a voluntary act”) and on notions of culpability. Once we admit that 
culpability is shaping the parameters for determining a voluntary act, we are 
faced with the new challenge of deciding what effect should culpability play in 
adjudicating introducing-prison-contraband cases. 
IV.  EFFECT ON INTRODUCING-PRISON-CONTRABAND CASES 
I think the first and most obvious effect of admitting that we select our 
voluntary acts, in part, on notions of culpability is that introducing-prison-
contraband cases will be decided on personal, or at best normative, grounds.78 
At first, this result might not seem too dire; all crimes are created by normative 
grounds in as much as our legislature reflects the people’s moral stance. As 
Henry Hart puts it, crime “is conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, 
will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of 
the community.”79 At some level then, the ultimate culpability of one 
introducing prison contraband will always be tied to the community’s moral 
 
Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 
632, 639 (1963). 
 76. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 explanatory note on subsection (1) (“Under the Code, liability 
cannot be based upon mere thoughts . . . .”). 
 77. L.A. Zaibert, Intentionality, Voluntariness, and Culpability: A Historical-Philosophical 
Analysis, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 459, 493 (1998). 
 78. Robert Leikind, Regulating the Criminal Conduct of Morally Innocent Persons: The 
Problem of the Indigenous Defendant, 6 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161, 161–62 (1986) (“Moral 
culpability refers to a voluntary breach of known norms which guide the conduct of a community. 
All members of a community live with the expectation that they have knowledge of the 
community’s norms and standards. When members of a community breach established norms, their 
actions are perceived to involve some quantum of moral turpitude, precisely because they were 
expected to know their conduct was offensive.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 79. Henry M. Hart Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405 
(1958). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
754 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:739 
stance. The issue only arises when the court’s notion of culpability is opposed 
to that of the community.  
Fortunately, the law does not have to conclusively answer the most difficult 
questions, like, what exactly comprises voluntariness and what is the best 
standard of culpability. The law need only meet these problems head-on with 
statutes effectuating if not the best, at least a consistent, level of culpability.  
Unfortunately, it is difficult to draft accurate statutes for introducing-prison-
contraband cases because the added moral reprehensibility which distinguishes 
simple drug possessors from drug smugglers lies primarily in their intention, and 
not their actions. Take for example two criminals: Criminal A possesses two 
grams of marijuana, which he hopes and intends to smuggle into a local 
correctional facility by getting arrested. Criminal B possesses two grams of 
marijuana and has no intention or hope of ever introducing it into a correctional 
facility. In fact, just the opposite, criminal B would prefer to not have the 
marijuana at a correctional facility, for fear of committing a more serious crime. 
One would hope that when criminal A is arrested and searched at the county jail, 
he is charged under the introducing-prison-contraband statute. However, when 
criminal B, who has committed identical acts to criminal A, is arrested and 
searched, one would hope that he receives a lighter sentence than criminal A.  
How then are the statutes to distinguish the two criminals? Statutes can 
criminalize intention in the form of mens rea requirements, but not without 
creating significant evidentiary hurdles, as evidence of mens rea relies generally 
on circumstantial evidence.80 Additionally, the mens rea of “knowingly” used 
in many introducing-prison-contraband cases is subsumed by the act of 
possession. Possession, as one scholar points out, is not really an act, but more 
of a status.81 The MPC defines possession as (1) having “knowingly procured or 
received the thing possessed” or (2) when one is “aware of his control thereof 
for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession.”82 And “[a]n 
act is ‘voluntary’ when the bodily movement is the product of conscious effort 
or determination.”83 Putting these two together, as Gideon Yaffe notes, (1) 
knowingly procuring an object is a conscious bodily movement, but (2) simply 
being aware of one’s control is not.84 Because possession is frequently number 
(2), and not an act, it is difficult to employ a mens rea requirement. Instead, what 
usually ends up happening is courts read an unwritten requirement of knowledge 
into the object of possession. That is, courts require that the defendant “know” 
 
 80. State v. Germain, 79 A.3d 1025, 1032 (N.H. 2013) (“We note that although most cases 
will include direct evidence as to at least one element, proof of mens rea will usually depend 
entirely upon circumstantial evidence.”). 
 81. Gideon Yaffe, In Defense of Criminal Possession, 10 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 441, 442–43 
(2016). 
 82. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(4) (AM. LAW INST., 1962) 
 83. 1 Charles E. Torcia, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 25 (14th ed. 1978). 
 84. Yaffe, supra note 81, at 443. 
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he or she currently possesses the object, not that he or she “knowingly” procured 
it.85 When the standard is mere knowledge of an items’ presence, both criminal 
A and criminal B will always satisfy the mens rea requirement. The challenge 
then is to create statutes which ferret out an intent to violate the statute, without 
creating meaningless mens rea requirements. 
I propose three changes that could be made to states’ introducing-prison-
contraband statutes which would accurately satisfy the culpability concerns 
surrounding intent and a single voluntary act requirement, without the collateral 
effect of criminalizing those who are guilty of mere possession. 
The first change is to include language which mandates a warning from the 
arresting officer before a defendant can be found guilty of introducing prison 
contraband. The language could look like this86: 
X. It shall be the duty of the police officer to inform any person arrested and 
taken to a correctional facility that: 
(i) He or she will be searched upon admission to the correctional facility; 
(ii) Knowingly delivering, attempting to deliver, having in his or her possession, 
depositing, or concealing in or about the premises of any county or private jail 
or other county correctional facility any item listed in subdivision (1)-(4) of 
subsection 1 may constitute a felony; 
(iii) Announcing possession of any item listed in subdivision (1)-(4) of 
subsection 1 will not prevent further prosecution. 
A mandatory warning helps separate criminal A from criminal B, not by 
requiring any further voluntary acts or imposing a new mens rea, but by 
revealing intention and therefore culpability. Both criminals, after the warning, 
have the choice between admission or retention of their drugs. Regardless of 
what the criminals choose or why, if either criminal is later found to have drugs 
at the facility, he or she cannot argue that the possession is unintentional because 
he or she knew the impending consequences. 
In most instances the officer provides a warning of his or her own accord, 
despite there being no requirement.87 But so long as the officer need not warn 
defendants of a potential introducing-prison-contraband charge, the door is open 
 
 85. See, e.g., State v. Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d 816, 817 (Minn. 2012) (holding that where the 
court was to assume an unwritten mens rea of “knowingly” in the context of possession of a gun in 
public, that mens rea required that defendant know a gun was present in his suitcase, not that he at 
some point knowingly procured or received the gun). 
 86. I modify the statutory language of Missouri Revised Statutes section 221.111 (2017) 
because that is the state in which I write. However, this language could be incorporated into any 
statutory scheme. 
 87. Of the thirteen cases cited supra notes 11 and 12, ten include a reference to an officer 
warning defendant that his or her possession of contraband at the county jail could constitute a 
felony. However, the prevalence of these warnings is attributable to good policing not to good 
policy. No state’s statute requires this warning. 
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for courts to satisfy only the letter of the voluntary act requirement, i.e., that it 
“includes a voluntary act,” and not its purpose of ensuring culpability. 
The court does exactly this in State v. Barnes, when it held that “the 
voluntary act necessary for guilt of the offense made punishable by General 
Statutes of North Carolina section 90–95(e)(9) occurs when the defendant 
knowingly possesses a controlled substance,” regardless of whether the officer 
warned the defendant that his retention of contraband could constitute a further 
felony.88 Because voluntary possession alone does not fairly predicate the 
increased punishment from mere possession (here, a class three misdemeanor) 
to introducing prison contraband (here, a class H felony), the culpability 
concerns of the voluntary act requirement are not satisfied.89 But, as the court 
points out, the single voluntary act requirement certainly is satisfied.90 In effect, 
by admitting only the possession was voluntary, North Carolina is imposing an 
increased punishment for the performance of an involuntary act. That is a 
problem. A statutory mandate fixes this problem by making the previously 
optional and arbitrary culpability determination both explicit and certain. 
Moreover, a warning like this would not be unique to criminal codes. Most 
States require that an officer give fair warning to a motorist that refusal to submit 
to field or chemical sobriety tests may result in penalties.91 In Pennsylvania for 
instance, the statute states, in pertinent part:  
(2) It shall be the duty of the police officer to inform the person that: 
(i) the person’s operating privilege will be suspended upon refusal to submit to 
chemical testing . . . ; and 
(ii) if the person refuses to submit to chemical testing, upon conviction or plea 
for violating section 3802(a)(1), the person will be subject to the penalties 
provided in section 3804(c) (relating to penalties).92 
And, of course, Miranda v. Arizona requires that before questioning a 
defendant in custody, police officers must inform him (1) that he has the right to 
remain silent; (2) that his statements may be used against him at trial; (3) that he 
has the right to the presence of an attorney during questioning; and (4) that if he 
cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him.93 
Warnings like those required by Miranda and States administering on-the-
scene Blood Alcohol Tests exist to assure the courts that the subsequent action 
 
 88. 747 S.E.2d 912, 920 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013). 
 89. Id. at 924. 
 90. Id. at 920. 
 91. DONALD H. NICHOLS & FLEM K. WHITED III, 1 DRINKING/DRIVING LITIGATION: 
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL § 11:15 (2d ed. 2016). 
 92. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547 (2016). 
 93. 384 U.S. 436, 471, 473 (1966). 
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is voluntary.94 Admittedly, when the Court in Miranda speaks of voluntariness 
it is not referring to the conscious bodily movements required by voluntary act 
statutes.95 Nevertheless, the admissibility of a confession depends on its 
voluntariness because only voluntary confessions have the evidentiary power to 
ground punishment.96 Therefore, although Miranda’s warnings, and those like 
it, do not ensure voluntary acts in the physical sense, they nonetheless ensure 
voluntary acts in a culpability sense, in as much as they ensure the punishment 
can be fairly administered. 
Also, a mandatory warning for arrestees would not affect those already 
confined in correctional facilities. Another difficulty in drafting introducing-
prison-contraband statutes is ensuring that those already within correctional 
facilities fall within the meaning of the statute, but not those who, although 
technically on the premises of a correctional facility, are not yet fully admitted. 
The proposed warning applies only to “any person arrested and taken to a 
correctional facility,” not to any person on the premises of a correctional facility. 
Therefore, the protections afforded by the statutory warning are narrowly 
tailored to affect only arrestees being taken to facilities. 
The second suggestion is to require the arrestee to sign a disclaimer upon 
entry of the county jail. This disclaimer would inform the arrestee that if he or 
she possesses any contraband he must declare so immediately or face potentially 
higher charges. The county jail in State v. Cole, implemented such a warning 
and its language in relevant part was as follows:  
You’ve indicated that you have no weapons, drugs, [or] anything that will hurt 
me during this search, etc. [sic] on your person or in your possession (Other than 
what you’ve told me). If you tell me now about any such items, if illegal, you 
may be charged with their possession. If you do not tell me now and I find them 
 
 94. The dissent in Miranda refers to the mandatory warning as attempting to require 
“voluntariness with a vengeance.” Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Congress later attempted to 
limit Miranda’s high burden for voluntariness. Pub. L. No. 90–351, 82 Stat. 210 (1968) (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012)). The opening line of § 3501 reads “[i]n any criminal 
prosecution . . . a confession . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.” But in 
United States v. Dickerson, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the need for Miranda’s warning to ensure 
that confessions are voluntary. 530 U.S. 428, 431–32 (2000). 
 95. In fact, the Miranda Court is referring to almost the opposite. It says, “Again we stress 
that the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically 
oriented.” 384 U.S. at 448. The Court wished to ensure that confessions are psychologically 
voluntary, not physically voluntary, which is the concern of voluntary act statutes. 
 96. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596–97 (1896) (“While the admissions or confessions of 
the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of 
incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a 
crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial 
character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, 
to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions . . . made the system so odious 
as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition.”). 
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during this search, you will not only be charged with their possession, but [you] 
will also be charged with Introducing Contraband into a Detention Facility[.]97 
Again, such a warning has no effect on whether the conduct includes a voluntary 
act. In fact, in State v. Cole, the defendant was not found to have voluntarily 
introduced prison contraband, despite signing such a disclaimer, because “the 
undisputed facts show[ed] that Defendant did not bring contraband into the 
[county jail]; law enforcement brought him and the contraband in his possession 
into the facility.”98 But, even though the disclaimer does not affect the 
commission of a voluntary act, it does guarantee that the defendant is culpable, 
which is the underlying purpose of the voluntary act requirement, and the 
element most frequently lacking in these cases. 
It must be noted that in order for disclaimers such as the one used in Cole to 
work, the case law must change. As it stands, a person is guilty of introducing 
prison contraband as soon as he or she steps foot in the door of the correctional 
facility, or possibly, as soon as he or she steps foot in the parking lot.99 So, while 
the disclaimer promises the arrestee that declaring the contraband will insulate 
him or her from the heightened charge of introducing prison contraband, this is 
not entirely true. The defendant has already committed the crime of introducing 
prison contraband by being in the correctional facility. The disclaimer is only an 
agreement to not press the admittedly committed charge of introducing prison 
contraband. 
Whether such disclaimers are binding on prosecutors is up for debate. The 
State’s Department of Corrections would write the disclaimer. And, police 
officers conducting the arrest and search would be issuing the promises within 
the disclaimer. Although some State and circuit courts are willing to offer relief 
for agreements made between government officials and arrestees on estoppel 
 
 97. 164 P.3d 1024, 1025 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007). 
 98. Id. at 1027. 
 99. There are no cases in which the defendant is charged with introducing prison contraband 
for his or her presence in the parking lot, but in such an instance the defendant would be just as 
guilty of being on the premises of a correctional facility as he or she would be inside. In most 
introducing-prison-contraband cases, the searches take place inside the facility but before the 
defendant is admitted to his or her cell. For instance, in State v. Cargile, the defendant was found 
to have marijuana in the cuff of his pants before he is placed in a holding cell. 916 N.E.2d 775, 776 
(Ohio 2009). The court’s language in State v. Eaton is instructive: “As [the State] rightfully points 
out, he’s inside the jail. Whether he’s been admitted inside the jail or is walking through the jail, 
he’s inside the secure facility. He’s under arrest. And he has possession. And if you read the statute, 
it says, mere possession inside the facility gives rise to the enhancement.” 177 P.3d 157, 158–59 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2008). Or for a comparable case outside the contraband context, see United States 
v. Coleman, where the defendant kicked an officer in the shin while being carried through a 
revolving door to a post office. 475 F. Supp. 422, 423 (E.D. Penn. 1972). Even though defendant 
was involuntarily carried from a public place into the threshold of a federal building (i.e., the post 
office) he was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 113(d) (2012), which prohibits “striking, beating, or 
wounding” another “within the . . . territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. at 423. 
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grounds supported by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 100 the general rule 
is that only prosecutors may conduct binding plea agreements.101 
A non-binding agreement to not prosecute a crime that has already been 
committed is not effective. To give the disclaimer any practical protection for 
an arrestee the case law would need to change to an understanding that the 
arrestee is not guilty of introducing prison contraband until after formal search 
and admittance. Only then would the statement of the disclaimer, “[i]f you do 
not tell me now and I find [contraband] during this search, you will not only be 
charged with their possession, but [you] will also be charged with Introducing 
Contraband into a Detention Facility” be true. As it currently stands, regardless 
of whether the arrestee admits possession of contraband, he or she can be 
charged with introducing prison contraband. 
The third and final suggestion is to statutorily distinguish between 
introducing prison contraband and possessing prison contraband. Missouri, 
Kentucky, and Arizona, among other states, currently contain a single 
introducing-prison-contraband statute which punishes both introducing prison 
contraband and possessing prison contraband.102 If these States were to separate 
introducing contraband from possessing contraband, they could apply useful 
distinctions in mens rea and location to target specific types of offenders. 
Missouri’s introducing-prison-contraband statute, section 221.111, states: 
1. A person commits the offense of possession of unlawful items in a prison or 
jail if such person knowingly delivers, attempts to deliver, possesses, deposits, 
or conceals in or about the premises of any correctional center as the term 
“correctional center” is defined under section 217.010, or any city, county, or 
private jail. 
Consider the following modification to the statute: 
X. A person commits the offense of introducing unlawful items into a prison or 
jail if such person knowingly delivers or attempts to deliver into the premises of 
any correctional center as the term “correctional center” is defined under section 
217.010, or any city, county, or private jail. 
Y. A person commits the offense of possession of unlawful items in a prison or 
jail if such person knowingly possesses or conceals within the premises of any 
correctional center as the term “correctional center” is defined under section 
217.010, or any city, county, or private jail. 
 
 100. United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 37 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Rodman, 519 
F.2d 1058, 1059–60 (1st Cir. 1975); United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 427–28 (4th Cir. 1972); 
People v. Fisher, 657 P.2d 922, 931 (Colo. 1983). 
 101. Commonwealth v. Stipetich, 652 A.2d 1294, 1295 (Pa. 1995) (“Affording police officers 
authority to enter agreements that [bind the State] . . . . would create havoc in the administration of 
justice . . . .”). 
 102. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2505 (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 520.050 (2017); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 221.111 (2017). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
760 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:739 
Z. For the purposes of subsection Y, no person being searched as part of an initial 
admittance process shall be found to be within the premises of any correctional 
center as the term “correctional center” is defined under section 217.010, or any 
city, county, or private jail. 
Under this proposed statute, criminals like A and B could be separated on purely 
statutory grounds. For instance, if a person is arrested and taken to the county 
jail, due to subsection Z, he or she is no longer automatically in violation of 
section 221.111, by reason of his or her mere possession. However, the person 
could still be in violation of subsection X. Importantly, though, violation of 
subsection X requires a showing that he or she knowingly delivered or attempted 
to deliver the contraband into the premises. The added requirement of proving 
delivery or attempted delivery effectively safeguards those like criminal B, who 
involuntarily brought contraband to the correctional facility, because mere 
possession of contraband at the initial search stage will not be sufficient evidence 
of delivery. Yet, because delivery is still punished, those like criminal A, who 
voluntarily brought contraband with the intention to smuggle the items inside 
can still be found guilty. Admittedly, there are new evidentiary hurdles posed by 
requiring a showing of delivery, but these hurdles are small and surmountable if 
the arrestee is truly guilty. Evidence of delivery could include an intended or 
probable recipient, a suspicious quantity of contraband, or a contraband item 
uniquely useful to the prison context.103 These evidentiary hurdles will 
undoubtedly create some instances where the guilty criminal walks free, but they 
will also ensure freedom for many more innocent arrestees. 
Additionally, separating the acts of delivery and possession by statute helps 
prevent courts from using disjoining/unifying behavior to selectively find 
voluntary acts. A court will no longer be able to claim possession at a 
correctional facility is a contributing action of delivery into a correctional 
facility when the possession is itself a punishable action.  
As a passing note, there is one more significant reason to rework our 
introducing-prison-contraband statutes: cellphones. The use of cellphones in 
prisons has become widespread and dangerous enough to warrant federal 
attention.104 In response, many States have begun addressing cellphone use in 
 
 103. Take for example the case of State v. Boykins, where the defendant tried to ship thirty 
cellphones, tobacco, and codeine to his brother. There, the recipient (the brother), the quantity of 
one of the items (fifty cellphones), and the quality of the items (three items forbidden in prison) all 
point toward intent to deliver and not personal use accidentally present at a correctional facility. 
No. W2012–01012–CCA–R3–CD, 2013 WL 1229393, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 27, 2013). 
 104. Contraband Cell Phones in Correctional Facilities: Public Safety Impact and the 
Potential Implications of Jamming Technologies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., 
and Transp., 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg564 
06/html/CHRG-111shrg56406.htm [https://perma.cc/Y3W7-VDCM]; Erin Fitzgerald, Comment, 
“Cell Block” Silence: Why Contraband Cellular Telephone Use in Prisons Warrants Federal 
Legislation to Allow Jamming Technology, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1269, 1269 (2010). 
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prisons by adding cellphones to their lists of contraband.105 The addition of 
cellphones to contraband lists poses a major problem considering so many State 
courts’ interpretation of their introducing-prison-contraband statutes. While 
perhaps few arrestees possess marijuana or a weapon at the time of their arrest, 
nearly everyone will possess a cellphone.106 Under the interpretation espoused 
in cases like Winsor and Barnes, any person present on or about the premises of 
a correctional facility, who voluntarily possesses his or her cellphone, will be in 
violation of an introducing-prison-contraband statute. Arizona has already 
charged someone in such a circumstance under its introducing-prison-
contraband statute.107 In State v. Francis, an arrestee used his cellphone to call 
his attorney. The defendant remained in possession of his cellphone when law 
enforcement transported him to jail.108 The defendant was acquitted on the 
grounds that he was not aware his cellphone was contraband,109 but States 
lacking statutes with similar knowledge requirements will have to confront the 
problems posed in the Francis situation.110 
These three proposed changes, (1) mandatory officer warnings, (2) 
mandatory written disclaimers, and (3) a reworking of our introducing-prison-
contraband statutes, each ensure an objective level of culpability where the 
single voluntary act requirement does not. By employing one of these three 
methods, a State’s legislature can make certain that any person arrested and 
taken to jail with contraband will only be held liable if he or she meets an explicit 
 
 105. For legislative responses see, for example, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-14 (2013) (“C. As 
used in this section, ‘contraband’ means: . . . (5) an electronic communication or recording device 
brought onto the grounds of the institution for the purpose of transfer to or use by a prisoner.”); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 21 (2015) (“E. Any person who knowingly, willfully and without 
authority brings into or has in his or her possession in any secure area of a jail or state penal 
institution or other secure place where prisoners are located any cellular phone or electronic device 
capable of sending or receiving any electronic communication shall, upon conviction, be guilty of 
a felony . . . .”). For judicial responses see, for example, People v. Green, 927 N.Y. S.2d 296 (Sup. 
Ct. 2011) (holding that cell phones are dangerous contraband within the meaning of the prison 
contraband statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.00(4)); Mays v. State, 76 A.3d 778 (Del. 2013) (noting 
a cellphone was within prison contraband statute, DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 1256 (2008)). 
 106. Pew studies showed that roughly ninety-two percent of Americans use a cellphone. 
Monica Anderson, Technology Device Ownership: 2015, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 29, 2015), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/technology-device-ownership-2015/ [https://perma.cc/2E 
J5-S6RU]. 
 107. State v. Francis, 388 P.3d 843, 844 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 848. 
 110. Missouri may soon become such a state. Missouri’s House of Representatives member 
Paul Fitzwater has proposed HB 207 which adds cellphones to Missouri’s list of contraband. 
However, because Missouri’s statutes are written such that the defendant need only knowingly 
possess the cellphone and not additionally know the cellphone is contraband, any person who finds 
him or herself in Francis’s situation will be in violation of Missouri Revised Statutes section 
221.111 (2017). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
762 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:739 
level of culpability. Otherwise, judges will continue to employ the arbitrary 
selection of voluntary acts with the help of time-framing and disjoining/unifying 
acts in order to reach results they find satisfy personal notions of guilt.  
CONCLUSION 
The voluntary act requirement should do what it was meant to do: ensure 
culpability. Under a single voluntary act view it does not. Nowhere is this more 
evident than in our introducing-prison-contraband cases. Right now, the 
majority of States find a woman, arrested, placed in the back of a police car, and 
driven to a correctional facility with drugs in her pocket, to be guilty of 
introducing prison contraband. This woman could have no desire to commit the 
crime, or, if the drugs were a cell phone, she might not even know the crime was 
being committed. Nevertheless, courts have time and again found these 
defendants liable. 
In response to the seemingly limitless boundary of the single voluntary act 
requirement, I propose the explicit addition of culpability. And in response to 
the hopelessly subjective nature of culpability I propose three statutory solutions 
which will assure culpability where the voluntary act requirement does not. 
These three solutions, a statutory warning, a signed disclaimer, and a clarifying 
of the statute, ensure that the introducing-prison-contraband statutes punish only 
those who either intend to bring contraband into a correctional facility or at least 
were well aware that retaining the contraband would incur higher charges. 
To end, I return to the question that opened this Paper: When has one 
committed the crime of introducing prison contraband? In a certain sense, the 
answer is as soon as one possesses contraband. For it is that action, possession, 
on which the court bases liability. This paper has argued that answer is unjust: 
unjust because possession does not foreseeably result in introducing prison 
contraband; unjust because the crime was not intentional; and unjust because, 
despite passing the letter of our voluntary act statutes, the act does not reflect 
culpability. 
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